Sinaya: A Philippine Journal for Senior High School Teachers and Students


Humanities, Arts and Education

Research Advisor

Mark Anthony L. Dacela, PhD


The traditional definition of lying has been challenged by contemporary philosophers who have raised multiple counterexamples in recent years. At the forefront of these counterexamples are bald-faced lies, selfless assertions, and misleading - all phenomena that fulfill the conditions of the traditional definition of lying yet are not considered conventional lies. The emergence of these cases has prompted philosophers to ask the question, “Is the intent to deceive a necessary condition for lying?” There are generally two philosophical stances concerning the topic: the deceptionists, who believe that the intent to deceive is a necessary condition for lying, and non-deceptionists, who believe that the intent to deceive is an unnecessary condition for lying. This paper will explore the deceptionist account of Jennifer Lackey, who claims that the separation of the intent to deceive from lying is an unhappy divorce, and Don Fallis’ non-deceptionist reply to Lackey. Fallis argues that this separation is not so unhappy of a divorce and claims that lying need not appeal to deception. This paper will argue that Fallis is mistaken in his claim, providing counterexamples that his account fails to capture as lies. Furthermore, this suggests that Fallis has misrepresented Lackey’s argument.