Are modal conditions necessary for knowledge?

Date of Publication

2013

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

College

College of Liberal Arts

Department/Unit

Philosophy

Thesis Adviser

Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin

Defense Panel Chair

Napoleon Mabaquiao, Jr.

Defense Panel Member

Elenita Garcia
Lorenz Moises Festin
Dennis Apolega
Ciriaco Sayson

Abstract/Summary

In this work, the author argues for the claim that modal conditions, particularly sensitivity and safety, are not necessary for knowledge. He does this by first investigating problem cases for both modal conditions, noting that they point to an internal glitch that even a revised similarity ranking or ordering of worlds, which others proposed, cannot fix. He then demonstrates, by way of a set theoretical profiling of the problem cases and a set theoretical analysis of the modal semantics at work in both sensitivity and safety, that these modal conditions fail whenever necessary links that are constitutive of epistemic circumstances actually obtain but are not modally preserved And since there are instances when knowledge only requires this, he concludes that modal conditions are not necessary for knowledge.

Abstract Format

html

Language

English

Format

Print

Accession Number

CDTG005503

Shelf Location

Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F Henry Sy Sr. Hall

Physical Description

127 leaves : ; 28 cm. + 1 computer optical disc ; 4 3/4 in.

Keywords

Knowledge; Theory of

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