Auction design: An experimental approach in assessing economic criteria in auction formats

Date of Publication

2006

Document Type

Bachelor's Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Science in Applied Economics

College

Ramon V. Del Rosario College of Business

Department/Unit

Economics

Thesis Adviser

Gerardo Largoza

Defense Panel Chair

Gerardo Largoza

Defense Panel Member

Cesar Rufino

Marissa Garcia

Abstract/Summary

This paper examines the four basic auction formats using experimental methodologies to ascertain the effects of auction design on the various economic criteria prescribed. Computer programs designed to embody basic attributes of each auction format are used in the experiments conducted. These served as means for the group to observe the decision-making behavior of participants and to compare economic results across auction formats. The results of this study depict certain deviations from auction theory literature and previous experiments of other papers. Main assertions from the experimental data show (1) significant departures of Vickrey experimental results from the established theory (2) a distinctive Dutch auction-induced bidding behavior, (3) bidder dropouts in English auctions (4) an erratic equilibrium-convergence pattern for English auction results and (5) the breakdown of the revenue equivalence theorem.

Abstract Format

html

Language

English

Format

Print

Accession Number

TU14306

Shelf Location

Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F, Henry Sy Sr. Hall

Physical Description

197 leaves : ill. (some col.) ; 28 cm. ; Computer print-out.

Keywords

Auctions--Design

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