Auction design: An experimental approach in assessing economic criteria in auction formats
Date of Publication
2006
Document Type
Bachelor's Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Science in Applied Economics
College
Ramon V. Del Rosario College of Business
Department/Unit
Economics
Thesis Adviser
Gerardo Largoza
Defense Panel Chair
Gerardo Largoza
Defense Panel Member
Cesar Rufino
Marissa Garcia
Abstract/Summary
This paper examines the four basic auction formats using experimental methodologies to ascertain the effects of auction design on the various economic criteria prescribed. Computer programs designed to embody basic attributes of each auction format are used in the experiments conducted. These served as means for the group to observe the decision-making behavior of participants and to compare economic results across auction formats. The results of this study depict certain deviations from auction theory literature and previous experiments of other papers. Main assertions from the experimental data show (1) significant departures of Vickrey experimental results from the established theory (2) a distinctive Dutch auction-induced bidding behavior, (3) bidder dropouts in English auctions (4) an erratic equilibrium-convergence pattern for English auction results and (5) the breakdown of the revenue equivalence theorem.
Abstract Format
html
Language
English
Format
Accession Number
TU14306
Shelf Location
Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F, Henry Sy Sr. Hall
Physical Description
197 leaves : ill. (some col.) ; 28 cm. ; Computer print-out.
Keywords
Auctions--Design
Recommended Citation
Ang, S. K., Chua, M. F., & Iranzo, K. C. (2006). Auction design: An experimental approach in assessing economic criteria in auction formats. Retrieved from https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/5992