On fuzzy coalitions

Date of Publication

2009

Document Type

Bachelor's Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Science in Mathematics with specialization in Business Applications

Subject Categories

Mathematics

College

College of Science

Department/Unit

Mathematics and Statistics

Thesis Adviser

Ederlina G. Nocom

Defense Panel Chair

Yvette F. Lim

Defense Panel Member

Mark Anthony A. Garcia
Gaudencio C. Petalcorin, Jr.

Abstract/Summary

This paper is an exposition of Chapter 6 and 7 of the book Models in Cooperative Game Theory: Crisp, Fuzzy, and Multi-Choice Games by R. Branzei, D. Dmitriv, and S. Tijs, pp. 77-88 [1]. It focuses on Fuzzy Coalitions, a concept in cooperative game theory dealing with coalitions with participation levels between 0 and 1. This paper presented the relationship between crisp and fuzzy coalitions, regarding games, imputations and cores. Also, this paper showed how crisp and fuzzy games can be transformed into fuzzy and crisp games, respectively. Furthermore, definitions, examples and other interpretations are thoroughly discussed which include unanimity games, t-restricted games, multilinear extension, imputation set, aubin core, stable sets, proper core, and dominance core.

Abstract Format

html

Language

English

Format

Print

Accession Number

TU15127

Shelf Location

Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F, Henry Sy Sr. Hall

Physical Description

vi, 97, [12] leaves, illustrations, 28 cm.

Keywords

Game theory; Fuzzy systems

Embargo Period

4-4-2021

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