JEL Classification System
D72, D80
Abstract
Consider two politicians who decide whether to follow what they believe the electorate wants or choose the option that secures their private gain. Policies are implemented when the politicians reach a unanimous decision. The electorate only rewards a politician when a policy is implemented or when the politician is the only one whose action coincides with the popular decision. The results show that if politicians have good decision-making abilities, sufficiently high payoffs in policy implementation—given moderate private agenda payoffs—push them to implement the popular policy. For very poor decision- making abilities, at sufficiently high policy rewards, politicians vote for the same action to implement a policy regardless of what the electorate wants— converging to a decision that neither provides them with a private benefit nor follows exactly the popular decision. For issues of very high relevance to the electorate, only popular policies are passed.
Recommended Citation
Go, Anne Marie
(2023)
"Incumbent Competition and Private Agenda,"
DLSU Business & Economics Review: Vol. 32:
No.
2, Article 8.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.59588/2243-786X.1160
Available at:
https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/ber/vol32/iss2/8
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