Veto players and state decisiveness: Negotiating bilateral economic partnership agreements between Japan and Southeast Asia
College
College of Liberal Arts
Department/Unit
Political Science
Document Type
Article
Source Title
Philippine Political Science Journal
Volume
33
Issue
1
First Page
39
Last Page
62
Publication Date
12-1-2012
Abstract
This article extends the veto player framework introduced by Haggard and McCubbins in 2001 to examine state decisiveness toward bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in developing countries of Southeast Asia. It uses as reference points Japan's bilateral economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. As argued in the Haggard and McCubbins framework, decisiveness is a function of the number of effective veto players arising from a country's institutional configuration. In addition, this article proposes that the political environment as it affects veto player preferences be considered in explaining decisiveness. The article further discusses the political consequences of decisive policy-making behavior in Southeast Asian democracies. © 2012 Philippine Political Science Association (PPSA).
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Digitial Object Identifier (DOI)
10.1080/01154451.2012.684516
Recommended Citation
Batalla, E. C. (2012). Veto players and state decisiveness: Negotiating bilateral economic partnership agreements between Japan and Southeast Asia. Philippine Political Science Journal, 33 (1), 39-62. https://doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2012.684516
Disciplines
International Relations
Keywords
Southeast Asia—Commercial treaties; Japan—Commercial treaties; Southeast Asia—Commerce—Japan; Japan—Commerce—Southeast Asia
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