Dreyfus on Heidegger's critique of Husserl's intentionality: A review

College

College of Liberal Arts

Department/Unit

Philosophy

Document Type

Article

Source Title

Philosophia (Philippines)

Volume

38

Issue

1

First Page

85

Last Page

104

Publication Date

12-1-2009

Abstract

This paper primarily disputes Dreyfus's account of Heidegger's critique of Husserl's theory of intentionality. Specifically, it raises objections to the three central claims of such an account; namely: (1) that Searle's theory of intentional action can be used as a stand-in for Husserl's; (2) that Heidegger rejects the primordiality of the intentionality of consciousness; and (3) that Heidegger distinguishes between conscious and unconscious types of intentional actions and he privileges the latter over the former. I show the first to be unwarranted owing to a lack of fundamental parallelisms between Searle's and Husserl's theories of intentionality. I show the second to be mistaken for failing to take into account Heidegger's strategic handling of the concept of consciousness and for contradicting Heidegger's concept of care as the essential meaning of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Lastly, I show the third to be highly problematic for lacking in textual evidence and explanatory power.

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Disciplines

Philosophy

Keywords

Intention

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