Where epistemic safety fails

College

College of Liberal Arts

Department/Unit

Philosophy

Document Type

Article

Source Title

Kritike

Volume

14

Issue

2

First Page

54

Last Page

75

Publication Date

12-2020

Abstract

In a previous paper, I briefly profiled unsafe beliefs as either: (1) beliefs formed using a method that is conditionally reliable and (2) beliefs formed using a method with unstable reliability. I dubbed these profiles as B-type and C-type, respectively. Extending this analysis, I will demonstrate how these belief types operate and why they fail in some notable counterexamples to safety offered by Neta and Rohrbaugh, Cosmesaña, Baumann, Kelp, Bogardus, and Freitag. Examining these cases also motivate my thesis that a method’s conditional reliability or instability does not render a belief formed by an actually reliable method unjustified; its epistemic worth remains intact, unsafe as it may be.

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Disciplines

Philosophy

Keywords

Belief and doubt

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