(Inter) subjective-situated moral ought: Zahavi’s reconstruction of Husserl’s metaphysics of intersubjectivity and its ethical implications

College

College of Liberal Arts

Department/Unit

Philosophy

Document Type

Article

Source Title

SPUQC Journal

Volume

2

Issue

1

First Page

130

Last Page

97

Publication Date

2009

Abstract

In reinterpreting Husserl's theory constitution, freeing it from its subjective tendencies and revealing Husserl's intention to go beyond epistemology, Dan Zahavi addresses the problem of relativism and liberates Phenomenology from the limiting idea that it is simply a descriptive method. This paper, explores the ethical implications of Zahavi's findingds. It seeks to establish the groundwork for a phenomenological ethics that is not simply descriptive and does not prescribe a relative ought - an ethical that establishes the significant role of epoche and reduction in the determination of the intersubjectively constituted but subjectively known and situationally defined ought. Within the framework of Husserl's theory of constitution the author explores the possibility of constructing a phenomenological ethics that (1) prescribes a way of knowing the ought - a method that provides an answer to the ethical question: what ought I do? - and more importantly (2) presents a description of the moral ought that goes beyond subjectivism: the intersubjectively constituted moral ought. The author asserts that the moral ought, phenomenologically described, though embodied in moral situations and subjectively known, is intersubjectively constituted.

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Disciplines

Philosophy

Note

Cover only

Keywords

Intersubjectivity; Conduct of life; Ethics

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