Allocating resources in a chemical plant security system with the use of game theory and ALOHA

College

Gokongwei College of Engineering

Department/Unit

Chemical Engineering

Document Type

Article

Source Title

Process Integration and Optimization for Sustainability

Publication Date

3-20-2025

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to identify security vulnerabilities within a chemical production system and to determine the optimal allocation of defensive resources, considering different attacker types and their potential strategies, minimize vulnerability, and maximize facility security. Chemicals are the driving force behind contemporary civilization. Chemical facilities provide a significant risk due to the presence of hazardous materials and challenging production circumstances. Research indicates that an assault on a chemical facility has the potential to result in a significant number of casualties. Given the increasing frequency of terrorist strikes globally, communities must use their limited defensive resources to safeguard chemical facilities against potential attacks. Extensive research has been conducted on the probability of terrorists targeting chemical industries. The existing literature on plant protection operates under the assumption that the aggressor exhibits “rational” behavior. This paper examines a game theory model that aims to safeguard chemical plants in situations when both the defender and the attacker exhibit “bounded rationality.” This paper assumes that the attacker will utilize techniques that have a high potential for profit and a high likelihood of success. This paper also employs game theory to allocate defensive resources. It employs game theory and risk assessment to analyze the tactics employed by both defenders and attackers. The assailants at the chemical facility target the most valuable objectives. The attacker’s parameters in the model are unknown. It implements a previously researched algorithm for solving games. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that despite a bounded rational attacker reducing the anticipated gain for the defense, the equilibrium strategy remains robust.

html

Digitial Object Identifier (DOI)

10.1007/s41660-025-00507-w

Disciplines

Process Control and Systems

Keywords

Chemical plants—Security measures; Chemical industry—Security measures; Game theory

Upload File

wf_no

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS