On Searle and Putnam's criticisms of computational psychology: Some reflections on conceptions of the self, science and technology

College

College of Liberal Arts

Department/Unit

Philosophy

Document Type

Archival Material/Manuscript

Publication Date

2009

Abstract

Philosophers have perennially contended with the advancements of science, In more recent times, philosophers like John Searle and Hilary Putnam have criticized the view, sometimes called "computational psychology" that the human mind is some sort of computer, This paper argues that the debates bring to the fore the importance of rethinking the conception of one's self as science and technology advance, To support this, the paper also claims that Putnam is not necessarily at odds with Searle's argument and recognize that Putnam has a different starting point.

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Disciplines

Philosophy

Note

Undated; Publication/creation date supplied

Keywords

Philosophy of mind; Self (Philosophy); John R. Searle; Hilary Putnam

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