Date of Publication
7-2026
Document Type
Master's Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts in Philosophy
Subject Categories
Philosophy
College
College of Liberal Arts
Department/Unit
Philosophy
Thesis Advisor
Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr
Defense Panel Member
Lorenz Moises J. Festin
Abstract (English)
The paper examines whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems can possess autonomy in the Frankfurtian sense, and whether Bostrom’s Orthogonality Thesis supports a negative answer. Frankfurt’s account of freedom of the will requires second-order volition, where an agent wants a certain desire to become effective as the will. Bostrom’s Orthogonality Thesis states that intelligence and final goals are independent variables. Using these two frameworks, the paper argues that AI systems cannot yet be said to possess Frankfurtian autonomy on the basis of intelligence, competence, or goal-directed behavior alone. The paper concludes that present evidence of AI subgoals and adaptation does not yet establish the second-order reflective endorsement required for freedom of the will in the Frankfurtian sense.
Abstract Format
html
Abstract (Filipino)
Sinusuri ng papel na ito kung kaya ng mga sistema na artificial intelligence (AI) magkaroon ng awtonomiya sa Frankfurtian na kahulugan, at kung kaya suportahan nito ng Orthogonality Thesis ni Bostrom upang magbigay ng negatibong sagot. Ayon kay Frankfurt, ang awtonomiya ay nangangailangan ng second-order volition, kung saan ang ahente ay may gustong magkaroon ng pagnanais na maging epektibo bilang kanyang will. Ayon sa Orthogonality Thesis ni Bostrom, ang intelligence (intelihensiya) at final goals (huling layunin) ay malayang baryabol. Gamit yung dalawang ideya na ito, ang papel na ito ay nagsasabi na ang mga AI na sistema ay hindi pa may-ari ng Frankfurtian na awtonomiya na nasusukat lamang sa intelihensiya, kakayahan, o pagtuturo sa layunin. Ipinapakita ng papel na ang kasalukuyang ebidensya ng mga subgoal at adaptasyon ng AI ay hindi pa sapat upang maitatag na meron silang second-order reflective endorsement na kinakailangan para sa malayang kalooban sa Frankfurtian na kahulugan.
Abstract Format
html
Language
English
Format
Electronic
Keywords
Autonomy (Philosophy); Artificial intelligence—Philosophy
Recommended Citation
Garcia, N. N. (2026). Second-order volitions and artificial intelligence: Frankfurt, Bostrom, and the limits of autonomy. Retrieved from https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etdm_philo/13
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Embargo Period
8-2-2027
