Date of Publication

2022

Document Type

Bachelor's Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts Major in Philosophy

Subject Categories

Epistemology | Philosophy

College

College of Liberal Arts

Department/Unit

Philosophy

Thesis Advisor

Mark Anthony L. Dacela

Defense Panel Member

Rober James M. Boyles
Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, III
Elenita D. Garcia

Abstract/Summary

Is the experience of guilt enough to give me at least immediate justification for the corresponding moral beliefs that I have formed through guilt? Our emotions are claimed to have an epistemic role to play when we form our moral beliefs. For this reason, such an epistemic role entails that emotions can be sources of prima facie justification for our moral beliefs. However, the same emotion is susceptible to objections. These objections argue that guilt necessitates other reasons which regard the moral emotion as epistemically inaccurate and redundant. Because of this, the experience of guilt does not confer immediate justification. In this paper, I argue against these objections such that I claim that guilt can be a source of prima facie justification for moral beliefs. In support of this, I use J. Adam Carter’s reliabilist framework that focuses on the agent’s emotional competence. Carter’s Emotional Competence View values the epistemic disposition of the agent in forming the corresponding beliefs. In application of my response to the objections and my use of the Emotional Competence View, I further extend my claim to the moral belief, eating meat is wrong, under the light of the Meat Paradox.

Abstract Format

html

Language

English

Format

Electronic

Physical Description

15 leaves

Keywords

Meat industry and trade; Emotions; Guilt

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Embargo Period

7-28-2022

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