Date of Publication

9-18-2021

Document Type

Bachelor's Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Science in Applied Economics major in Industrial Economics

Subject Categories

Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Economics

College

School of Economics

Department/Unit

Economics

Honor/Award

Outstanding Undergraduate Thesis Award

Thesis Advisor

Mariel Monica R. Sauler
Dickson A. Lim
Jason P. Alinsunurin

Defense Panel Chair

Mariel Monica R. Sauler





Defense Panel Member

Dickson A. Lim
Jason P. Alinsunurin



Abstract/Summary

This study uses a game theoretic approach to assess how the government can influence firms’ CSR investment and production decisions to enhance social welfare, considering the negative externalities brought by unsustainable production and positive externalities brought by CSR investments. Using a Stackelberg duopoly as a base model and lump sum tax as the government’s decision variable, this study finds that when the government chooses not to intervene, it results in greater environmental damage as firms will underinvest in CSR and overproduce in quantity to achieve profit maximization. As such, the model extends to the assumption that the government acts as a benevolent dictator to model how firms will act under a regulated environment to achieve the Pareto Optimal Outcome. Ultimately, this study shows that firms have to be placed under a regulated environment so as to prevent them from exploiting resources and damaging the environment, thereby negatively affecting societal welfare.

Abstract Format

html

Language

English

Format

Electronic

Physical Description

114 leaves

Keywords

Social responsibility of business; Sustainable development; Environmental policy

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Embargo Period

9-16-2023

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