Allocations in sponsored game

Date of Publication

2011

Document Type

Master's Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Science in Mathematics

Subject Categories

Mathematics

College

College of Science

Department/Unit

Mathematics and Statistics

Thesis Adviser

Ederlina G. Nocon

Abstract/Summary

One of the main problems in cooperative game theory is the fair division of the rewards that are jointly obtained by the cooperating members of a team. In the case of a particular game, known as sponsored game which consists of two sets of players; the sponsors S = {si|1 ≤ i ≤ k} and the team players T={tj|1≤j≤p},eachsponsorsi ∈Striestobring cooperation on the set of team players. Cooperation is attained by giving a corresponding reward system vi ∈ Svi to the formed coalition M ⊆ T such that vi : 2T → R≥0 with vi(∅) = 0 . Every team player tj ∈ T now decides to join or not to join in a coalition M ⊆ T . A formed coalition M will then receive a group reward of V (M) = X vi(M). Since the members of i=1 S and T act simultaneously, their decisions affect the benefits received by the team players, as well as the payoff of the sponsors. In this paper, we discuss some allocation schemes for the team players. Specifically, we consider schemes that are designed based on the concept of proportional allocation, min-max allocation, reasonable allocation set, the core and dominance core.

Abstract Format

html

Language

English

Format

Electronic

Accession Number

CDTG005726

Shelf Location

Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F Henry Sy, Sr. Hall

Keywords

Cooperative games (Mathematics)

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Embargo Period

8-4-2023

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