Title

Nash equilibria in a multiple stage inspection game

Date of Publication

2015

Document Type

Master's Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Science in Mathematics

Subject Categories

Mathematics

College

College of Science

Department/Unit

Mathematics and Statistics Department

Thesis Adviser

Yvette F. Lim

Abstract/Summary

An inspection game is a mathematical model of a situation where an inspector verifes that another party, called inspectee, adheres to certain legal rules. This paper will consider a model with one inspector and n inspectees and investigate the Nash equilibria of a multiple stage inspection game given a budget allocation. The inspector I sets a target level for budget allocation of each inspectee Pi. The inspector decides to allocate percentage of the target level to n inspectees who work non cooperatively. In each inspection time, computations of Nash equilibria is presented. There are three cases for the inspector's budget in relation to the sum of the target levels for the inspectees. First, when the budget is more than the sum of the target levels for all inspectees. Second, the budget is more than enough for some inspectees, but not enough for all inspectees. Lastly, the budget is exactly equal to the sum of target levels for some inspectees. The paper will show that only the case with budget more than the sum of target levels of all inspectees can be extended into a multiple stage inspection game.

Abstract Format

html

Language

English

Format

Electronic

Accession Number

CDTG006587

Shelf Location

Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F Henry Sy Sr. Hall

Physical Description

1 computer optical disc ; 4 3/4 in.

Keywords

Game theory; Mathematical models

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