Reciprocity, social approval and equity considerations: A gift-exchange experiment in one-shot and repeated interaction
Date of Publication
2008
Document Type
Bachelor's Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Science in Applied Economics
College
Ramon V. Del Rosario College of Business
Department/Unit
Economics
Thesis Adviser
Marissa Garcia
Cesar C. Rufino
Defense Panel Chair
Gerardo L. Largoza
Abstract/Summary
This experimental study investigates how effort behavior of workers is influenced by intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives under the environment of incompletely specified contractual relations of a gift-exchange game. Three treatments which involve one-shot and repeated interactions were employed in the experiment namely, Stranger Treatment, Partner Treatment, and Social Approval Treatment. This paper finds evidence that reciprocity exists in workers’ effort behavior, reputation building has an effect and social approval has the most significant and positive effect on workers' effort behavior. It can be implied from this study that efficiency gains between employers and employees can be realized without depending solely on coercion and financial incentives as motivators. Other motivators are essential, that has something to do with reciprocity.
Abstract Format
html
Language
English
Format
Accession Number
TU16071
Shelf Location
Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F, Henry Sy Sr. Hall
Physical Description
62[55] leaves 29 cm.
Recommended Citation
Diaz, M. L., Fang, R. G., Go, J. Y., & Uy, A. B. (2008). Reciprocity, social approval and equity considerations: A gift-exchange experiment in one-shot and repeated interaction. Retrieved from https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/14732
