Framing effects in a simple barga[i]ning experiment: Testing for self-serving bias and hot and cold effects
Date of Publication
2006
Document Type
Bachelor's Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Science in Applied Economics
Subject Categories
Economics
College
Ramon V. Del Rosario College of Business
Department/Unit
Economics
Thesis Adviser
Gerardo Largoza
Defense Panel Member
Cesar Rufino
Angelo Taningco
Abstract/Summary
This paper investigates whether framing effects consistently appear in experimental situations. Simple bargaining games are used to test the existence of (1) self-serving bias and (2) hot and cold effects, which are known to be triggered by the use of frames conducive to them. The results of the study show that framing effects do not always hold in the ways they are predicted to be: self-serving bias is subtle when people are provided with an alternative that ensures them compensation enough to make up for opportunity loss hot and cold effects do not hold in the expected ways when experimental design is open to inertia. The experimental results also exhibit that people (1) choose to be efficient when they are in the situation to make offers (2) take advantage of others who chose to be efficient, but (3) behave in inconclusive ways when they are given choices to punish others.
Abstract Format
html
Language
English
Format
Accession Number
TU14315
Shelf Location
Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F, Henry Sy Sr. Hall
Physical Description
98 leaves : ill. (some col.) ; 28 cm.
Keywords
Negotiation--Mathematical models
Recommended Citation
Cheng, S., Lee, S., Revilla, C., & Roque, R. (2006). Framing effects in a simple barga[i]ning experiment: Testing for self-serving bias and hot and cold effects. Retrieved from https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/14363