To evade or to pay: A perfect bayesian equilibrium in a government-importer game
Date of Publication
2013
Document Type
Bachelor's Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Science in Applied Economics
Subject Categories
Economics
College
Ramon V. Del Rosario College of Business
Department/Unit
Economics
Defense Panel Chair
Lawrence Dacuycuy
Defense Panel Member
Luisito Abueg
Ruperto Majuca
Marites Tiongco
Abstract/Summary
This paper studies the phenomenon of tariff evasion using a simple signaling model. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is used to determine importer's optimal actions (to evade or to pay his tariff liability) after observing the signal of the government (high tariff rates or low tariff rates), given the importers belief on the true type of the government (strict or not strict). This study found that in the separating equilibrium, importers will chooses to pay their respective tariff liability upon observing a low announcement coming from a strict government. On the other hand, upon observing high tariff rates with the belief that it came from a Not Strict government, importers will opt to evade. Meanwhile, pooling equilibrium suggests that regardless of the perceived type of government when a high tariff is implemented, importer will opt to pay his liability
Abstract Format
html
Language
English
Format
Accession Number
TU20054
Shelf Location
Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F, Henry Sy Sr. Hall
Physical Description
68 leaves ; 28 cm.
Keywords
Bayesian statistical decision theory; Econometrics; Liability insurance; Indemnity against liability
Recommended Citation
De La Rosa, M. G., Respicio, J. P., & Samson, C. G. (2013). To evade or to pay: A perfect bayesian equilibrium in a government-importer game. Retrieved from https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/10695
Embargo Period
1-7-2022
