An exploration of Charles Hartshorne's view of divine omnipotence in the context of the problem of evil: Uncovering the aesthetic venture of God in process

Date of Publication


Document Type


Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy


College of Liberal Arts



Thesis Adviser

Celestino Gianan

Defense Panel Chair

Florentino T. Timbreza

Defense Panel Member

Jove Jim Aguas
Anacleto S. Carag
Robert Roleda
Gansham Mansukhani


Hartshorne reclassified what he meant by omnipotence. The problem then focuses in determining, if he provided the right reconceptualization of what he meant by God and his omnipotence. In such perspective, one has to trace it back on the proper definition and classification of omnipotence, whether it is meant only for God (as the final benefactor) or the world. The possible grounds that label the insufficiency of God's power in the Hartshornian perspective are the following: First, God is not the only power. Second, God will not perform what is absurd, in doing for the world what it can do for itself.The reason why God cannot move beyond the structure can be explained by Hartshorne's rejection of the traditional view of omnipotence, implying that he monopolizes power to himself. God to break the law proves that he is the only one who has absolute control of anything. But there are exceptional and extreme situations that call for him to break it. When the world can no longer push, only God's action is summoned by the ethical, that goes beyond the dictations of what is structurally appropriate. In that case, process posts its own law, subject to its own value and dynamicity. But still, Hartshorne asserts the view that God absolutely prefers never to go beyond the given.

Abstract Format






Accession Number


Shelf Location

Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F Henry Sy Sr. Hall

Physical Description

244 numb. leaves ; 28 cm.


God--Omnipotence; Theory (Philosophy); Good and evil; Panentheism; God--Omniscience

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