Title

On determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game

Date of Publication

2014

Document Type

Bachelor's Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Science in Mathematics

Subject Categories

Physical Sciences and Mathematics

College

College of Science

Department/Unit

Mathematics and Statistics Department

Abstract/Summary

This paper will discuss an inspection game model between an inspector and multiple inspectees based on the work of Yael Deutsch, Boaz Golany and Uriel G. Rothblum published on the European Journal of Operational Research on January 2011. An inspection game is a situation where an inspector veri es the adherence of an inspectee to prescribed regulations. This paper shows a lemma, a theorem and their detailed proofs in nding all the possible Nash equilibria of such single-stage inspection game with multiple inspectees.

Abstract Format

html

Language

English

Format

Electronic

Accession Number

CDTU019205

Shelf Location

Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F, Henry Sy Sr. Hall

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