On determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game
Date of Publication
2014
Document Type
Bachelor's Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Science in Mathematics
Subject Categories
Physical Sciences and Mathematics
College
College of Science
Department/Unit
Mathematics and Statistics
Abstract/Summary
This paper will discuss an inspection game model between an inspector and multiple inspectees based on the work of Yael Deutsch, Boaz Golany and Uriel G. Rothblum published on the European Journal of Operational Research on January 2011. An inspection game is a situation where an inspector veri es the adherence of an inspectee to prescribed regulations. This paper shows a lemma, a theorem and their detailed proofs in nding all the possible Nash equilibria of such single-stage inspection game with multiple inspectees.
Abstract Format
html
Language
English
Format
Electronic
Accession Number
CDTU019205
Shelf Location
Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F, Henry Sy Sr. Hall
Recommended Citation
Orense, D. M., & Torrevillas, S. R. (2014). On determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game. Retrieved from https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/18007
