On cycles with undistinguished actions and extended rock-paper-scissors game
Date of Publication
Bachelor of Science in Mathematics with specialization in Business Applications
College of Science
Mathematics and Statistics Department
Mark Anthony Garcia
This thesis is an exposition of the articles written by Eric Bahel and Hans Haller  . The aim of this study is to identify the unique Nash equilibrium of a cycle-based game under a strict preference relation. In particular, the game Rock-Paper-Scissors has a unique Nash equilibrium where each action is given a weight of one-third. Furthermore, this study discusses and illustrates the characterization of the set of Nash equilibria for a two-player zero-sum game based on a cyclic preference relation. There exist two cases for this characterization. First, if the game has even actions, there exists a continuum of mixed strategies. In the case of odd actions, a unique Nash equilibrium is obtained.
Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F, Henry Sy Sr. Hall
1 computer disc ; 4 3/4 in.
Rock-paper-scissors (Game); Game theory
Ang, A. R., & Pineda, L. P. (2016). On cycles with undistinguished actions and extended rock-paper-scissors game. Retrieved from https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/14923