Title

On cycles with undistinguished actions and extended rock-paper-scissors game

Date of Publication

2016

Document Type

Bachelor's Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Science in Mathematics with specialization in Business Applications

Subject Categories

Mathematics

College

College of Science

Department/Unit

Mathematics and Statistics Department

Thesis Adviser

Mark Anthony Garcia

Abstract/Summary

This thesis is an exposition of the articles written by Eric Bahel and Hans Haller [2] [3]. The aim of this study is to identify the unique Nash equilibrium of a cycle-based game under a strict preference relation. In particular, the game Rock-Paper-Scissors has a unique Nash equilibrium where each action is given a weight of one-third. Furthermore, this study discusses and illustrates the characterization of the set of Nash equilibria for a two-player zero-sum game based on a cyclic preference relation. There exist two cases for this characterization. First, if the game has even actions, there exists a continuum of mixed strategies. In the case of odd actions, a unique Nash equilibrium is obtained.

Abstract Format

html

Language

English

Format

Electronic

Accession Number

CDTU020324

Shelf Location

Archives, The Learning Commons, 12F, Henry Sy Sr. Hall

Physical Description

1 computer disc ; 4 3/4 in.

Keywords

Rock-paper-scissors (Game); Game theory

Embargo Period

5-11-2021

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS