Abstract: The traditional definition of lying has been challenged by contemporary philosophers who have raised multiple counterexamples in recent years. At the forefront of these counterexamples are bald-faced lies, selfless assertions, and misleading - all phenomena that fulfill the conditions of the traditional definition of lying yet are not considered conventional lies. The emergence of these cases has prompted philosophers to ask the question, “Is the intent to deceive a necessary condition for lying?” There are generally two philosophical stances concerning the topic: the deceptionists, who believe that the intent to deceive is a necessary condition for lying, and non-deceptionists, who believe that the intent to deceive is an unnecessary condition for lying. This paper will explore the deceptionist account of Jennifer Lackey, who claims that the separation of the intent to deceive from lying is an unhappy divorce, and Don Fallis’ non-deceptionist reply to Lackey. Fallis argues that this separation is not so unhappy of a divorce and claims that lying need not appeal to deception. This paper will argue that Fallis is mistaken in his claim, providing counterexamples that his account fails to capture as lies. Furthermore, this suggests that Fallis has misrepresented Lackey’s argument.

Keywords: lying; deception; selfless assertions; Jennifer Lackey; Don Fallis
The philosophical dispute on whether deception should be a necessary condition to consider an act as lying has been ongoing since Isenberg’s proposal of a standardized definition of lying. The traditional definition of lying, which states that to lie, one must declare a falsehood that a person himself does not believe in with the intent to deceive, was the most popular. In the traditionalist sense of the word, which was the view most commonly accepted in the 1960s and 1970s is that, “A lie is a statement made by one who does not believe it with the intention that someone else shall be led to believe it” (Isenberg, 1973, p. 433). In this definition, the liar must believe that his statement is false and that the victim considered his false statement true. In addition, a lie can be viewed as having to fulfill three conditions before being considered a lie. According to Stokke (2013, p.18), these three conditions are:

L1. A says that $p$ to B, and

L2. A believes that $p$ is false, and

L3. By saying that $p$ to B, A intends to deceive B into believing that $p$.

This definition of lying is known as the Augustinian Definition of Lying.

However, as philosophers continued to debate, objections to all three conditions arose. Notably, the intent to deceive, which is the third condition, has been the most controversial of the three. The most prominent counterexample raised is the phenomenon of “bald-faced lies” in which lies are perceived as statements that are obviously false and are not said with the intent to bring about a false belief. For instance, Carson (2006, p. 286) cited that, “A man on the witness stand in a courtroom has witnessed a murder. Because there is CCTV footage that clearly shows the man witnessing the murder, and this footage has been presented to the jury, it is common
knowledge that everyone knows that the man saw the crime take place. But, for fear of reprisals, when asked whether he saw the murder, the witness says, “I did not see the murder.” Clearly, this example suggests that he is saying something false, yet at the same time, he does not intend for anyone to believe this false statement, which goes against the third condition. Thus, contemporary philosophers\textsuperscript{1} have taken to modifying or asserting their own conditions as to whether a statement should be considered a lie. Typically, these definitions fall under two trains of thought, deceptionist or non-deceptionist. Both definitions are categorized on the basis of the intent to deceive. Deceptionists\textsuperscript{2} maintain that the intent to deceive is necessary for a statement to be considered a lie, whilst non-deceptionists\textsuperscript{3} discard the intent to deceive in favor of other explanations. Principally, both groups had the same aim, which is to modify or create their own definition of lying that does not fall prey to the common objections towards the traditional definition (bald-faced lies, misleading, selfless assertions, etc.) However, since the appeal to deception carries such weight in the debate, deceptionists and non-deceptionists alike faced their own issues.

Ultimately, this paper approaches lies in an epistemological fashion. It aims to answer the question, “what kind of statement should be considered a lie?” By looking at two contemporary philosophers, Lackey and Fallis, who are both spearheads of the deceptionist and non-deceptionist fields of thought, respectively, the researchers aimed to compare both sides of the same coin. The objective of this paper then is to dispute Fallis’ non-deceptionist argument against Lackey, who claims that separating deception from lying would be an “unhappy divorce.” Consequently, the paper will enforce the idea that the intent to deceive is a necessary condition for lying.
Furthermore, this paper will imply that forms of statements similar to lies, such as the aforementioned bald-faced lies, white lies, and even irony and jokes, all require the intent to deceive as a necessary condition for lying.

Thus, to iterate clearly, this paper’s objectives are fourfold.

1. The paper aims to examine the deceptionist and non-deceptionist accounts of Lackey and Fallis, respectively.
2. The paper aims to assert that Fallis’ response to Lackey is inadequate. This will be done by proposing a modified version of Stella, the Creationist Teacher, that argues Fallis fails to account for certain lies.
3. This paper aims to briefly discuss the taxonomy of deception from Chisholm and Feehan (1977) that was mentioned in Fallis’ paper in order to fulfill other objectives.
4. Finally, this paper aims to provide an additional claim that Fallis has misrepresented Lackey’s definition of lying with his case, Hamlet the Dane.

Is the intent to deceive a necessary condition for lying?

Whether the intent to deceive should be a necessary condition for lying is being discussed by some contemporary philosophers. This philosophical debate does not only limit to Fallis and Lackey, which are part of the scope of this study, but also to other philosophers. In order to prove their own accounts, the authors explored bald-faced lies. Accordingly, Sorensen (2007) stated that bald-faced lies are morally neutral since they merely cause annoyance rather than harmful damage. On the other hand, Meibauer (2014) mentions that bald-faced lies are not actual lies, but acts of verbal aggression. Similarly, Keiser (2016) claims that bald-faced lies are not genuine lies due to the instances of its ingenuine assertions. On the contrary, Stokke (2018) argues that bald-faced lies are genuine lies and that lies are always assertions. In his paper, Stokke also mentions that,
“assertions do not always need to have the objective of convincing anyone with the content of their statement.” In response to this, Harris (2020) wrote about lying and intentionalism which also includes bald-faced lies in the scope. Harris argues that Stokke’s account about bald-faced lies faces serious problems and provides several responses on behalf of intentionalism.

**Lackey’s deceptionist account**

Although the main focus of Lackey’s paper is not the debate of bald-faced lies, her paper addresses a topic extremely relevant to this research: the divorce of deception from the traditional definition of lying. She uses the traditional form of lying as the basis for her paper, which to recap is (Lackey, 2013, p. 1):

LIE-T: A lies to B if and only if

1. A states that p to B,
2. A believes that p is false, and
3. A intends to deceive B by stating that p.

Thus, she states that there are three counterexamples to such a definition being bald-faced lies, knowledge-lies, and coercion lies. While this paper focuses mainly on bald-faced lies, it is essential to note that the emergence of these three counterexamples to the traditional form of lying spawned the severance of the intent to deceive from the traditional definition of lying. Lackey (2013) acknowledges that the aforementioned three counterexamples serve to disprove the traditional form of lying. However, that these counterexamples do not warrant the separation of deception from lying were further asserted. Thus, the goal of Lackey’s paper is to reinstate the
intent to deceive as a condition of lying, albeit with a slightly modified definition of lying, which she states (Lackey, 2013, p. 2):

\[
\text{LIE-L:} \text{ A lies to B if and only if}
\]

(i) A states that p to B,

(ii) A believes that p is false, and

(iii) A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that p.

The critical difference between her definition and the traditional definition of lying lies within the third condition. Other than having the intent to deceive, one must merely intend to be deceptive for a statement to be considered a lie. Although initially, the traditional definition and Lackey’s definition appears nearly identical, Lackey stipulates that by changing ‘deceive’ to ‘deceptive,’ she is able to capture the three kinds of lies that the traditional definition fails to capture. She accomplishes this by broadening the definition of deception. Other forms of deception include concealing misinformation, misleading, etc. These forms are not explicitly deceiving a person, yet in Lackey’s definition, they can be classified as lying. She further states that one must simply aim to be deceptive— that is even if the listener does not believe in the uttered statement, the speaker is still considered to be lying by her definition. Thus, Lackey’s deceptionist account, she argues, is able to capture the problematic lies that previous deceptionist accounts struggled to account for.

However, it is important to note that Lackey does not consider concealing information to be the same as withholding information. Withholding information is to simply fail to provide it, but to conceal information is to deliberately obstruct any attempts to find evidence of it. To
illustrate this difference, she provides the following situation “If I am trying to find a home for my challenging puppy, I withhold information about her lack of being housebroken if you do not ask me anything about it and I do not mention it. But if I frantically discard all of the training pads lying throughout my house before you come over, then I am concealing the information that she is not trained” (Lackey, 2013, p. 6). Particularly, concealing information is hiding the truth from someone regardless whether it is being asked about or otherwise while withholding information is deciding not to tell the truth unless someone asks about it.

Another counterexample that Lackey raises is that of the phenomenon known as “selfless assertions.” Selfless assertion is a statement made by the speaker that they do not necessarily believe in, usually for selfless reasons. She defines the phenomenon as having three components:

First, a subject, for purely non-epistemic reasons, does not believe that p; second, despite this lack of belief, the subject is aware that p is very well supported by all of the available evidence and, third, because of this, the subject asserts that p without believing that p. (Lackey, 2013, p. 7).

To prove her point, she brings up the example of Stella, a fictional Creationist teacher who teaches her students that humans evolved from apes despite not believing in that proposition herself. She argues that Stella’s situation fulfills all the conditions proposed by non-deceptionist accounts but cannot truly be considered a lie, as she intends not to bring about a false belief in her students or conceal her own beliefs on the matter. Instead, she is simply fulfilling her duties as a teacher (Lackey, 2013, p.9). The case goes as follows:
“Creationist Teacher: Stella is a devoutly Christian fourth-grade teacher, and her religious beliefs are grounded in a personal relationship with God that she takes herself to have had since she was a very young child. This relationship grounds her belief in the truth of creationism and, accordingly, a belief in the falsity of evolutionary theory. Despite this, Stella fully recognizes that there is an overwhelming amount of scientific evidence against both of these beliefs. Indeed, she readily admits that she is not basing her own commitment to creationism on evidence at all but, rather, on the personal faith that she has in an all-powerful Creator. Because of this, Stella thinks that her religious beliefs are irrelevant to her duties as a teacher. Accordingly, she regards her obligation as a teacher to include presenting material that is best supported by the available evidence, which clearly includes the truth of evolutionary theory. As a result, while presenting her biology lesson today, Stella asserts to her students, ‘Modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus’, though she herself does not believe this proposition.”

Specifically, Stella is not lying in this case, as she is stating a selfless assertion. Furthermore, Lackey raises a case wherein she claims that Stella is indeed lying. The modified version of the case states that “Suppose that everything about the case remains the same, except that Stella states to her students that Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus, not because she regards her religious beliefs on the matter as irrelevant to her biology lesson, but because she will get fired from her teaching job if she reveals such beliefs to her students” (Lackey, 2013, p.9). In this case, she intends to be deceptive towards her students, as she aims to conceal her personal religion-based belief in Creationism.

In conclusion, Lackey argues against the divorce of the intent to deceive from the definition of lying first by proving that deceptionist accounts can still account for the common objections against the traditional definition of lying. She then presented cases of non-lies, in the form of
selfless assertions, that common non-deceptionist accounts miscounted as lies. Finally, she makes her contribution to the debate by proposing her own modification to the third condition of lying, which is as follows: 

(3) A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that \( p \), thus creating Lackey’s definition of lying, LIE-L.

**Fallis’ non-deceptionist account**

Fallis (2015) argues that divorce between deception and lying is not that unhappy, as opposed to what Lackey suggests. His paper provides a thorough discussion of why bald-faced lies are not intended to be deceptive on any plausible notion of deception by providing counterexamples. Additionally, the paper addressed Lackey’s set of conditions in lying and then his own definition later on. Firstly, he suggests his main concern about how Lackey’s requirements are too broad and too narrow at the same time because he mentions that her definition fails to identify some bald-faced lies. It also counts utterances— that are not lies— as lies then Fallis proves this by using Creationist Teacher (on the former) and providing his case (on the latter) as his counterexamples.

To support his first argument, Fallis (2015, p.86-87) clarifies Lackey’s notion of deception by identifying where it falls under Chisholm and Feehan’s (1977) taxonomy of deception. This taxonomy consists of three dimensions where the notion of deception can be extended. The first dimension is where a liar does something that causes someone to believe a new false belief and to continue having a false belief. The second is when a liar makes an action causing someone to be agnostic or to fail to have a belief— regardless whether it is true or false— is the definition of second dimension. Lastly, a liar deliberately makes a move in order to hide the evidence of a true belief in the third dimension.
Fallis (2015, p.92) states that Lackey’s notion of deception does not extend along the third dimension since Lackey herself differentiates concealing and withholding information then she states that the former only counts in her definition of being deceptive. Thus, Fallis specifies here that Lackey’s notion of deception only extends along the second dimension due to her third condition (i.e., A intends to be deceptive to B by stating p).

Moreover, Fallis (2015, p.92) proves that Lackey’s definition does not count the student’s word in Creationist Teacher as lying by focusing on her third condition about one’s intent to be deceptive in stating a proposition. In this situation, the student does not admit to the Dean about his cheating incident during examination despite the common knowledge that it is indeed true and the event already occurred multiple times. He only denies it but clearly has no goal to fool anyone about it– meaning this fails to meet the last requirement in Lackey’s conditions. Thus, Fallis concluded that Lackey’s account is too broad because the student is not lying according to her definition.

With reference to the second argument, Fallis also provided an example wherein he is a professor who decided to convince strangers in an acquaintance party that he is an actor himself. He enacts this by doing a theatrical pose and stating this line from the play: “It is I, Hamlet the Dane”. He argues that it is intended that Fallis was being deceptive about being an actor. Still, he is not also lying since he is not deceptive about what he says (i.e., being the Hamlet or a Danish). However, this statement is a lie according to Lackey’s definition.

Conversely, the set of requirements below presents both his original account and the additional condition that he created as one of his responses to Lackey’s paper to the selfless
assertion case about a Creationist Teacher named Stella who was teaching a scientific theory that is supported by the evidence, despite the strong faith in her religion.

Fallis (2009, p. 34) states that A lies to B if and only if:

(1) A states that p to B,
(2) A believes that p is false and
(3) A believes that she makes this statement in a context where the following norm of conversation is in effect: Do not make statements that you believe to be false.

He then modified his definition by adding this requirement (Fallis, 2015, p. 92):

(4) A liar does not believe that the evidence suggests that what she says is true.

Fallis (2015, pp. 92-93) explicitly states that this is not an ad hoc modification since this change was made since most non-deceptive accounts state that Stella is lying to her students. Clearly, Stella is not lying because she teaches a lesson based on the evidence, rather than expressing personal beliefs based on her religious faith. Thus, this was made to correct the flaw seen in his original definition which mistakenly recounts Stella as a liar when she is only doing her professional job as a teacher.

Due to these arguments, Fallis disagrees with Lackey that breaking up deception from lying is an unhappy divorce. He made it clear that it is possible for deception to exist - without lying and vice versa. Therefore, bald-faced lies are non-deceptive lies since both lying and deception are not dependent on each other.
The Insufficiency of Fallis’ modified definition

After a thorough examination of both Lackey’s and Fallis’ arguments, this paper claims that Fallis’ response to Lackey is inadequate. First, Lackey correctly captures certain lies as lies while Fallis fails in doing so. Although Fallis has raised a counterargument against the case of Creationist Teacher, this paper proposes a modified version wherein Fallis’ account failed to be captured as a lie. Additionally, this proves that his modification of the fourth condition of his definition is ad-hoc, contrary to his previous claim. Secondly, the case of Hamlet the Dane wrongly misrepresents Lackey’s argument and should not be considered a valid counterargument against her deceptionist account. Finally, Lackey rightly counts Carson’s case as a lie wherein it disproves Fallis’ argument that Lackey fails to capture some bald-faced lies as lies.

Do Fallis and Lackey capture the Creationist Teacher as a lie?

The first contention of this paper is the selfless assertions, particularly in Stella’s case- the Creationist Teacher. As previously mentioned, Lackey first discussed this case as a response to the popular non-deceptionist accounts at the time. She claimed that the inability of non-deceptionist accounts to correctly identify her case as a lie, necessarily meant that deception is tied to lying as a matter of necessity. Fallis responded to her argument by claiming that the issue could be easily remedied by additionally requiring that the liar not believe that the evidence suggests what she says is true. This condition constitutes the fourth condition of Fallis’ definition of lying. Thus, Fallis claims that his definition avoids the fallacy of wrongly accusing Stella of being a liar.

This paper suggests a modified version of the Creationist Teacher, in which the teacher actually lies, yet, Fallis’ definition is unable to identify that she is lying. At the same time, it shows
that Fallis’ fourth condition is ad-hoc due to its inability to address counterexamples other than the original case of Creationist Teacher (CT).

**Our Modified Case of CT:** Stella asserts to her students that Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus. Although she strongly believes in Creationism, she also believes in Evolution Theory. However, one of her students protested that humans are made through Creationism in the middle of the class. She knows the following: 1) Her religious belief is not relevant to discuss in Science class, 2) Her teaching job is requiring Stella to teach facts rather than sharing her personal views, and 3) Her responsibility is to make sure that her students fully understand the lesson (which is Evolution Theory in this case). Thus, it results in Stella justifying Evolution Theory by saying that humans are not made through Creationism due to lack of scientific evidence (despite her personal religious belief).

In the modified version of Stella the Creationist Teacher, she intends to be deceptive towards her students. When directly confronted by one of her students as to the validity of her claim, she asserted that the Evolution Theory is the only accurate explanation of how humans were developed (and denying Creationism in the process). Thus, it follows that the modified case of Stella fulfills all conditions of Lackey’s definition of a lie as she:

**LIE-L:** A lies to B if and only if

(i) A states that p to B,

(ii) A believes that p is false,

(iii) A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that p
Given the context, Stella stated to her students that the Evolution Theory is the only accurate explanation of how humans were developed. This meets the first condition. In the second condition, Stella believes that Evolution Theory is the only accurate explanation of how humans were developed is false because it was mentioned in this version that she has a personal belief in Creationism as well. CT also satisfies the second condition. Lastly, Stella intends to conceal information about her personal belief in order to convince her students that Evolution Theory is the only accurate explanation of how humans were developed. As Lackey mentioned (see Lackey, 2013, p. 5), a liar is being deceptive to the victim by intending to conceal information from the victim whether a proposition is true or not. This means that Stella meets the third condition as well. Thus, the case is able to correctly capture the modified version of CT as a lie. However, Fallis’ definition of lying fails to capture the aforementioned case as a lie, even though the case is clearly defined as one. The case follows the first three conditions of Fallis’ definition but does not fulfill his modified fourth definition, wherein he states that: (4) A liar does not believe that the evidence suggests that what she says is true. It does not count the fourth condition because Stella believes that (scientific) evidence suggests that humans are not made through Creationism. She believes in Creationism mainly because of her religious views rather than the available evidence (like academic papers). Therefore, the proposed case is an example of a lie that Lackey correctly captures as a lie, but Fallis fails to capture as one.

**Is Fallis lying according to Lackey’s definition?**

Similarly, if there are cases of lying that Fallis fails to account for, are there cases of non-lies that Lackey’s definition fails to identify as non-lies? Fallis further argues that his case of Hamlet the Dane is an example of a non-lying that Lackey’s definition captures as a lie. The case goes as follows:
Hamlet the Dane (Fallis, 2015, p. 84): “For instance, suppose that I decide to try to convince a new acquaintance at a party that I am a professional actor (rather than an academic). So, I take a theatrical pose and intone, ‘This is I, Hamlet the Dane’. In making this statement that I believe to be false, I clearly intend to be deceptive (viz., about my being an actor). But I am not lying because I do not intend to be deceptive about what I actually say (viz., about being named as Hamlet or about being Danish) (see Fallis 2009, p. 40). However, according to Lackey’s definition, my statement is a lie.”

To examine this actor case, a recap of Lackey’s definition will be shown below to start on elaborating and justifying how her set of conditions correctly recognizes that Fallis is not lying in the given example.

LIE-L: A lies to B if and only if

(i) A states that p to B,

(ii) A believes that p is false, and

(iii) A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that p. (Lackey, 2013, p. 2)

In this case, Fallis states that “It is I, Hamlet the Dane” to strangers. This is already given by his case, which meets the first condition of Lackey’s definition. Next, Fallis believes that “It is I, Hamlet the Dane” is false. As he mentioned in his paper, Fallis precisely stated that his being Hamlet the Dane is false (see Fallis, 2015, p. 84). Thus, it also meets Lackey’s second condition. Lastly, Fallis intends to be deceptive to strangers by stating that “It is I, Hamlet the Dane”. This one is the most tricky part. Certainly, it is true that Fallis intends to be deceptive to strangers by trying to convince them that he is an actor rather than an academic because Fallis says this as well (see Fallis, 2015, p. 84). However, Fallis also particularly said that he does not intend to be
deceptive about being named as Hamlet nor being Danish. Thus, it is safe to say that this case does not meet the third condition. Lackey might not have explicitly reiterated it, but she clearly means that the liar has to be deceptive about their statement. Hence, Lackey’s definition rightly identifies Fallis’ Hamlet the Dane case, as not a lie, because he does not intend to be deceptive about what he said.

**Does Lackey count all bald-faced lies as lies?**

Additionally, Fallis used the said scenario to prove his argument that Lackey’s definition of lying is too narrow because it fails to count some bald-faced lies as lies. Fallis particularly utilized Carson’s case since Lackey provided this as a classic example of bald-faced lies. As further clarification, the example below was mentioned by both Lackey (2013) and Fallis (2015).

**Slightly modified version of Carson’s case:** “A student is caught flagrantly cheating on an exam for the fourth time this term, all of the conclusive evidence for which is passed on to the Dean of Academic Affairs. Both the student and the Dean know that he cheated on the exam, and they each know that the other knows this, but the student is also aware of the fact that the Dean punishes students for academic dishonesty only when there is a confession. Given this, when the student is called to the Dean’s office, he states, ‘I did not cheat on the exam.’” (Carson, 2010, as cited in Lackey, 2013, p. 2)

Fallis stated in his paper that the student is not aiming to conceal his guilt and its evidence, but the student is rather withholding the confession, which serves as evidence of his cheating to the Dean (see Fallis, 2015, pp. 88-91). However, as Fallis mentioned (see Fallis, 2015, pp. 85-86), Lackey’s notion of deception only extends along the second dimension of Chisholm and Feehan’s taxonomy. This suggests that being deceptive only includes concealing information and excludes
withholding information. Hence, a liar can intend to be deceptive by at least aiming to conceal information. In this case, the student appears not concealing his confession, but concealing the fact that he believes that he cheated because he uttered, “I did not cheat on the exam” to conceal the fact that he believes that he cheated on the exam. Regardless of whether the Dean knows this or not, aiming to conceal information is possible even if you are unlikely to succeed in doing so (see Lackey, 2013, p. 7). Thus, it meets the third condition of Lackey’s account (i.e., A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that p) which results in Lackey successfully capturing Carson’s case as a lie.

Possible objections

Fallis can challenge the claims of this paper with the argument that the case of CT does not necessarily prove that lying and deception are tied. The basis for this argument stems from the idea that if any non-deceptionist account can correctly discount Lackey’s cases of selfless assertion, then lying and deception are not tied together as a matter of necessity. Prior to Fallis’ reply to Lackey in 2015, the above conditional statement was unable to be disproved, as Lackey was able to successfully argue that the popular non-deceptionist accounts at the time were unable to identify the case of Stella as a non-lie correctly. However, with Fallis’ reply, he claims that his non-deceptionist account successfully disproves that lying and deception are not tied together as a matter of necessity, as his modified definition is able to correctly identify Stella’s case as a selfless assertion.

Although the modified case of CT is no longer a case of a selfless assertion, it is still a case that this paper argues Fallis failed to correctly capture as a lie. Accordingly, it implies that although Fallis’ modified definition is now able to distinguish selfless assertions from lies, it is still unable
to capture other lies, namely the modified case of CT. Then, it follows that his modified definition is an ad-hoc response to Lackey. And if his modified definition is indeed an ad-hoc response, then Lackey’s original argument that lying and deception are tied together as a matter of necessity still stands.

Conclusion and Insights

Lackey’s deceptionist view states that the divorce of deception from the definition of lying is an unhappy one, and Fallis’ non-deceptionist reply states that the divorce of deception from the definition of lying may not be so unhappy, offering two perspectives of the same claim. The researchers claimed that Fallis’ reply to Lackey was lacking, as his argument contained various holes. This was done by proposing a set of counterexamples that achieved three goals. 1) It was able to show that Fallis’ definition fails to capture the modified case of Stella, the Creationist Teacher, as a lie. 2) It was then argued and also proved that Lackey’s definition actually captures Fallis’ original case, namely Hamlet the Dane, as a lie.

After thoroughly examining the arguments presented by both philosophers and proposing this paper’s own argument, the researchers concluded that the ties between deception and lying are incredibly nuanced. Both deceptionist and non-deceptionist accounts raised valid points, and both had their shortcomings. For instance, Lackey’s deceptionist account could have made a clearer definition since it was misinterpreted by Fallis. Meanwhile, Fallis’ non-deceptive account has a good set of conditions, yet it still fails to capture some lies. Unquestionably, the main point here is that the matter should be viewed with the same discretion as other philosophical ideologies, which applies to both views at any given situation as necessary.
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Endnotes


4. In this modified version, Stella is known as a religious science teacher. Thus, it is common knowledge amongst the students that she believes in science and her religion.

5. According to Silva et. al. (2015), it is possible to believe in Evolution Theory and Creationism at the same time. Their survey shows that the majority of the respondents (i.e., Spiritualists, Catholics, Evangelicals, and Atheists) share this sentiment.
References


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